Criminal justice statistics measure recidivism in many ways, but all entail looking for a fact pattern indicative of relapsing into crime. 5 Professor Connor initially defined recidivism as offending "after having been sanctioned previously for" the same offense, but he immediately abandoned this definition by branding a company "as a recidivist . . . if it is convicted a second time for cartel conduct, no matter where or when the earlier violation took place." 6 While recognizing that "legal authorities may not consider a company that was engaged in contemporaneous cartels to be a recidivist because one illegal act did not precede the other," 7 Professor Connor elected not to investigate when a company participated in cartels relative to when it was convicted. Rather, he identified companies that had participated in more than one international cartel, anywhere in the world, at any time during 1990-2009. 8 Professor Connor counted the total number of international cartels in which each multiple offender had participated during 1990-2009. For companies that merged during that time period, he attributed to the successor the sum of the cartel offenses attributed to the predecessors. 9 5 The Bureau of Justice Statistics website observes: "There is no single definition of recidivism. However, all definitions share three common traits. Each has a starting event, such as release from custody, program completion, or placed on probation. Next, each has a measure of failure following the starting event, such as a subsequent arrest, a subsequent arrest for a violent crime, a conviction resulting from a subsequent arrest, or a new commitment resulting from a subsequent arrest. Finally, each has a recidivism window (e.g., 6 months, one year, two years, three years, etc.) beginning with the date of the starting event. Put together, an individual is said to have recidivated if the individual has a failure event within the recidivism window. A company that was the product of several mergers could have ended up with a double-digit cartel count even if the merged company itself had never engaged in cartel activity and even if none of its predecessor companies ever relapsed into cartel activity. This could help explain the extraordinarily high cartel counts: for 6 companies, the count was 20 or more cartels, and for 20 additional companies, the count was ten or more cartels. 10 Professor Connor went back to 1990 in identifying recidivism, but much has changed since then to enhance the deterrent effect of cartel enforcement in the United States. Critically, the Antitrust Division's leniency program was revamped in 1993, 11 In the 1990s international cartels became a central focus of the Antitrust Division. The Division had long viewed imprisonment of culpable individuals as critical to effective deterrence, but for most of the 1990s, the Division had to give up on the possibility of prison sentences for non-U.S. citizens who participated in international cartels in order to secure admissions of guilt, cooperation, and submission to U.S. jurisdiction. That practice came to an end with the prosecution of the vitamins cartels. Six non-U.S. citizens were imprisoned within a year, with the first sentenced on July 23, 1999. and it became the Division's most powerful tool for detecting cartels and securing the convictions of cartel participants. Prosecutions assisted by leniency applicants accounted for over 90 percent of the total commerce affected by all the cartels prosecuted by the Division since 1999. The sanctions imposed in U.S. cartel cases also ratcheted up in the 1990s. In 1996 a $100 million fine for cartel activity was imposed for the first time, and a fine of at least that much has now been imposed 18 times. During fiscal years 1990-99, 27 individuals with a cartel conviction were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, but during fiscal years 2000-09, that number nearly doubled to 50. 12 From that date to the present, a total of 47 non-U.S. citizens have been sentenced by U.S. 10 Id. at 116-17. 11 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10, 1993), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. 12 The first individual to be sentenced to prison in conjunction with the vitamins cartels was Dr. Kumo Sommer, a Swiss citizen and employee of F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. He entered into a plea agreement jointly recommending a fine of $100,000 and a prison sentence of four months, both of which were imposed by the court. Although Dr. Sommer was convicted of both engaging in cartel activity and making false statements to the government, the five others were convicted only of cartel activity, and their sentences ranged from three to five months. courts to prison terms for cartel activity, with nine receiving sentences of at least one year. 13 The Antitrust Division has been able to secure prison sentences for culpable non-U.S. citizens because the leniency program and improved cooperation with competition and law enforcement agencies in other countries substantially enhanced the Division's ability to access evidence outside the U.S. and secure jurisdiction over culpable individuals abroad. Our foreign counterparts began to cooperate and conduct parallel investigations resulting in sanctions. 14 Changing attitudes toward cartels by authorities in other countries occurred gradually, but 1998 was a watershed year for Europe. The OECD for the first time formally supported aggressive cartel enforcement, 15 the European Commission's Directorate General for Competition created a special unit to investigate cartels 16 and decided its first cartel cases under its new leniency program, 17 and the Commission issued its first fines guidelines. 18 Using as the starting point the day on which the first prison sentence was imposed on a non-U.S. defendant in an international cartel prosecution, 19 thoroughly reviewed the pertinent records.
Although Professor Connor considered only international cartels, we imposed no similar restrictions. Nevertheless, we found not even a single instance of cartel recidivism within the United States. No company and no individual convicted in the U.S. of a cartel offense after July 23, 1999 subsequently joined a cartel prosecuted in the United States. Moreover, no company and no individual granted conditional leniency after July 23, 1999 subsequently joined a cartel prosecuted in the United States.
Judge Ginsburg and Professor Wright observe that, over just the past few decades, several companies were convicted more than once in the United States for engaging in cartel activity, and they opine that this "tends to suggest there is a problem with recidivism. But a close examination of the charges reveals that no company with multiple convictions after July 23, 1999 relapsed into cartel activity. 21 Ajinomoto was convicted in 2000 and 2002 for its simultaneous participation in two separate international cartels, but its role in both had ended by the time either was charged. 22 Degussa affiliates were convicted in 2002 and again in 2004, but their participation in both cartels had ended in 1998. 23 remaining company convicted of multiple cartel offenses in the United States since July 23, 1999. 24 Akzo Nobel affiliates were convicted in 2001 and 2006, and the latter conviction was for cartel participation that ended after the prior conviction; however, Akzo Nobel joined the later cartel years before the earlier conviction. 25 Thus, none of these companies relapsed into cartel activity after being convicted.
Professor Connor did not identify any instances in which a company joined a cartel affecting the United States after having been sanctioned for cartel activity in the United States, so he did not substantiate his recidivism claims. We searched U.S. enforcement records for instances of cartel recidivism since July 23, 1999 and found none. Meaningful prison terms for both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens eliminated cartel recidivism within the United States. The claim of Professor Connor, and also of Judge Ginsburg and Professor Wright, 26 that current cartel sanctions have proved inadequate, therefore, is not supported by the existence of recidivism in the United States. 27 We have not investigated cartel recidivism outside of the United States, but we have observed how the presence and absence of individual accountability, with the threat of a prison sentence, has influenced international cartels. On numerous occasions, the Antitrust Division has interviewed members of international cartels who provided first-hand accounts of their participation in cartels that spanned the globe but stopped at the U.S. border because the participants feared going to jail. This eyewitness testimony is compelling evidence that enforcement in the Unites States is deterring cartel activity.
John Connor has asserted that recidivism by cartel participants is very common and is symptomatic of serious flaws in cartel enforcement. However, we searched U.S. enforcement records for instances of cartel recidivism and found none at all since July 1999 when the first non-U.S. national was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for participation in international cartel activity. All available evidence indicates U.S. cartel enforcement in the United States is at least achieving the specific deterrence of convicted offenders.
involved joining a cartel after the first non-U.S. citizen was sentenced to prison for international cartel activity.
